The Gentle Revolution: German Unification in Retrospect by Jeffares, Floy
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 20 
Number 3 Spring Article 7 
May 2020 
The Gentle Revolution: German Unification in Retrospect 
Floy Jeffares 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Floy Jeffares, The Gentle Revolution: German Unification in Retrospect, 20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 537 
(1992). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
The Gentle Revolution: German Unification
in Retrospect
I. INTRODUCTION
"The entire German people remains called upon to complete the
unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination."' This reunifi-
cation commandment or Wiedervereinigungsgebot operated in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany's legal and political system during the Federal
Republic's entire existence. On October 3, 1991, after nearly forty-five
years of partition and separate political, economic and ideological devel-
opment, the German people acheived the goal: unity created in self-deter-
mination. They fulfilled the commandment's second component, freedom,
as well - at least to the extent that the beneficiaries of a social-market
system understand the term. Just a little over a year passed between the
beginning of grassroots opposition movements against the East German
regime, including the spectacular opening of the Berlin Wall on Novem-
ber 9, 1989, until the December 3, 1990, completion of the merger of the
two states. East German leadership, having seen only Walter Ulbricht
and Erich Honecker as heads of state during its entire existence, changed
hands three times during the transitional period before it finally became
part of the Federal Republic.
This article will examine why the reunification, impossible to imagine
only six years ago, took such a rapid pace, thereby subjecting Easterners
and Westerners to the shock treatment of economic and political unity
without an interim period of acclimatization. In addition, this article will
address what alternatives existed to the swift unification process.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. From 1949 to 1989
In 1949, four years after the conclusion of World War II, the Allied
Forces agreed to the creation of two German states.2 The Western Allies
and the Soviet Union took control of the defeated Germany immediately
after the War. The partition of Germany was the result of the irreconcila-
ble differences the allies encountered in the exercise of that control.'
After the partition, the Western state named itself the Federal Re-
1. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [federal constitution], preamble (F.R.G.) [hereinafter GG]; see
also, Gregory v.S. McCurdy, Note, German Reunification: Historical and Legal Roots of
Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253, 259 (1990).
2. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV.
475, 629 (1991).
3. Id. at 479-480.
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public of Germany (Bundesrepublic Deutschland, F.R.G.), and organized
its public affairs in accordance with a quasi-constitutional political docu-
ment called the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The very name Basic Law,
chosen instead of Constitution (Verfassung), evidences the fact that the
F.R.G., from its inception, regarded itself as a temporary political entity.
The Western state's prevalent commitment to eventual unification is
manifest in a number of constitutional provisions. First, the Basic Law's
language provided for the possibility of constitutional change when the
remaining portions of post-war German territory acceded to the F.R.G.
Second, Bonn, a historically unknown and insignificant city, became the
seat of the new state, rather than Berlin, Munich, or Nuremberg, which
are traditional German capital "cities.5 Third, the Basic Law granted citi-
zenship to all persons of German origin and thereby included all citizens
of the East German state. Accordingly, all residents from the East who
were exiled to or fled to the West between 1949 and 1990 enjoyed the
same political and economic rights as F.R.G. citizens.' Finally, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, the high court charged with interpreting the
Basic Law, consistently held that the pre-war German Reich never ceased
to exist.' F.R.G.'s Western allies also supported the principle of eventual
unification throughout the decades of partition.'
The new Eastern state took the name German Democratic Republic
(Deutsche Demokratische Republik, G.D.R.) and adopted its own consti-
tution in 1949. This constitution was originally intended to apply to all of
Germany.' Initially, the G.D.R. and the Soviet Union were not hostile to
the possibility of future reunification. However, once the F.R.G. joined
NATO, the Eastern position changed, viewing the two German states as
separate entities. This position was codified in a revised version of the
G.D.R. constitution adopted in 1968 and amended in 1974.10 The 1968
and 1974 versions included basic principles of democratic centralism to be
implemented by the Communist Party: a planned economy, nationalized
property, and affirmative social welfare rights.1 In contrast with the
F.R.G. Basic Law, the G.D.R. constitution mentioned neither the possi-
bility nor the desirability of reunification."
4. GG art. 23 (F.R.G.) states:
For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the territory of the Laender
[individual states] Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hesse,
Lower Saxony, North-Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein,
Wuerttemberg-Baden, and Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern. It shall be put into
force for other parts of Germany on their accession.
5. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 257.
6. Id. at 259-260.
7. Quint, supra note 2, at 481.
8. Id. at 480.
9. Id. at 483.
10. Quint, supra note 2, at 483.
11. Id. at 488-490.
12. See CONSTITUTION OF THE G.D.R. [Verf. DDR] (1974).
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Due to ideological differences between the new German states and
their respective controlling superpowers, relations deteriorated during the
period of 1949-1972. For example, West Germany quickly became eco-
nomically superior to East Germany. Political and individual freedoms
enjoyed by the Western Germans exceeded those available in the East. As
a result, large numbers of G.D.R. citizens relocated to West Germany.
Because of the exodus to the West, the East German government erected
the Berlin Wall in August of 1961, thereby greatly aggravating the hostili-
ties between the two countries.'3 Many people died from guards firing at
them or land mines exploding while they attempted to escape from the
East.'
In 1972, the Social Democratic Government, led by Chancellor Willy
Brandt, initiated an inter-German treaty with the East German govern-
ment. This Fundamental Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) intended to ad-
dress and succeeded in solving immediate problems such as family re-
unions and traffic to and from Berlin."5 The Fundamental Treaty
recognized each German state's sovereign power, independence and
equality, and provided for separate international representation. By
meeting the reality of two separate political entities, the treaty relieved
some public and individual hardships.1 6
Although this treaty may be viewed as an abandonment of the once
strong commitment to unification, the language of the Basic Treaty re-
flected a faint optimism regarding the possibility of future reunification.
Recognition of two capitals was avoided by reference to "seats of govern-
ment," and the term "embassy" was replaced by the word "government
mission."1 In essence, the treaty did not purport to be a permanent solu-
tion but merely an instrument of the East-West detente that occurred
during the 1970s.
Even though the unification issue has been of significant political im-
portance to the West Germans throughout the F.R.G.'s existence, the de-
gree of importance varied according to political party perspective. The
conservative parties, Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) and
Christlich Soziale Union (CSU), considered the question of German
unity to be the highest priority;"8 consequently, they strongly disapproved
of any attempt to legitimize the sovereign existence of the G.D.R.' 9 The
13. See also Die Mauer - Symbol fuer die Teilung Deutschlands, NEUE PRESSE, Nov.
11, 1989, at 5.
14. Id. at 9.
15. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 267. The city of Berlin was completely surrounded by
G.D.R. territory.
16. See McCurdy, supra note 1, at 267-69.
17. Id. at 268-269.
18. Id. at 267.
19. In Bavaria, the largest and eastern-most state governed by CSU, school children
were taught to refer to East Germany by its abbreviated name so as to avoid pronouncing
the term "Democratic," contained in the full name. On the other hand, they were to refer to
their own state by its full name, rather than its acronym, to show respect. This is from the
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Liberal/Social-Democratic coalition, which governed during the 1970s, at-
tributed high importance to the national question. However, they ap-
proached the subject with the political realism necessary for easing the
ideological tensions that arose during the Cold War.20
For the Greens, a relatively new party that came into existence in the
late 1970s and gained seats in the parliament (Bundestag) in 1980, the
unification issue was of low priority in relation to issues of more global,
ecological or social nature. Suspicions traditionally held by twentieth-cen-
tury German leftists towards nationalism explain the Green Party's dis-
interest in the unification question.2"
B. From 1989 to 1990
In the summer of 1989, when Hungary opened its borders, thousands
of Germans - mostly young adults - crossed into Austria, for ultimate
relocation into West Germany. They also sought refuge in West German
embassies in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw.
2
Within East Germany, political opposition groups were formed, and
popular demonstrations took place in the city of Leipzig.2 These popular
uprisings were spared the Soviet/G.D.R. sponsored military crack-downs
encountered in the past. In fact, Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev warned
G.D.R.'s Honecker that he would not support any kind of intervention. 2
Shortly thereafter, Erich Honecker 25 resigned as General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party (SED) and was replaced by
Egon Krenz, a long-time Communist Party member.2 6 On November 9,
1989, the G.D.R. government opened the Berlin Wall, a sudden, unex-
pected, and highly celebrated event that marked the beginning of rapid
political changes, culminating in the unification of the two states less
than a year later.2 7 After the gates opened, masses of East Germans
flooded across the border for both temporary shopping visits and perma-
nent relocation. Initially, attempts were made to salvage the G.D.R. state
by implementing immediate and fundamental reforms. Egon Krenz, dis-
trusted by the people because of his standing within the Communist
Party, was quickly replaced by reformer Hais Modrow, one of the very
few officials of the SED who held the trust of the people. He replaced the
parliamentary governing body (Volkskammer) and initiated democratic
author's personal experience.
20. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 270.
21. Id. at 273.
22. Quint, supra note 2, at 485.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In 1991, Honecker fled and is currently hiding in the Russian embassy in Chile.
Russia officially requested him to be expelled from Santiago, and Germany wants his return
so he can stand trial for murder and related charges. NEUE PRESSE, March 7, 1992, at 1.
26. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 286. See also Quint, supra note 2, at 630; Kohl trifft
Krenz, NEUE PRESsE Nov. 13, 1989, at 3.
27. Die Berliner Mauer bekommt Locher, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 11, 1989, at 1.
VOL. 20:3
GERMAN UNIFICATION
elections, by means of which the last G.D.R. leader, Lothar de Mazi~re,
took leadership. 28 Central portions of the G.D.R. constitution were re-
vised and changed.29 A committee of East and West German academics
met regularly to draft a proposal for a new G.D.R. constitution, based on
the belief that the G.D.R. would continue in existence for at least an in-
terim period, and possibly permanently as a reformed state.,0
Subsequent changes in inter-German relations, however, proved to be
steps toward unification rather than attempts to build an interim East
German state. For example, the currency reform that took effect on July
1, 1990, replaced the non-convertible, low-valued East German Mark with
the stronger West German currency.31 The previously abolished five
states (Laender) were reconstituted: Berlin-Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt, Sachsen, and Thueringen. 2 Finally, on
August 31, 1990, the unification treaty was signed,3 followed by the Allies
suspending their reserved rights.3 ' On October 3, 1990, the newly revived
East German states acceded to the F.R.G. 5 Elections for the Laender
parliaments and for the first all-German Bundestag followed within the
same year."
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR UNIFICATION ANALYZED
A. The West
The West German government, led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl of
the CDU, began working towards unification as soon as the opening of the
borders allowed for speculation about the disintegration of the G.D.R..
This early focus on unification was evidenced by Kohl's ten-point plan, a
1989 proposal outlining the Steps by which to build a united Germany.3 7
Kohl's drive for a rapid merger was due in part to the F.R.G.'s constitu-
tional framework, the historical commitment of the Chancellor's party,
and to the heightened political importance the issue had gained among
the West German people.38 Working for unity was the most important
campaign issue for the 1990 Bundestag election. 9 The highly emotional
aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of all East Ger-
28. Quint, supra note 2, at 630.
29. See generally id. at 496-506.
30. Id. at 493.
31. Id. at 516.
32. See generally id. at 524-530.
33. Id. at 630.
34. The Allies retained certain rights following World War II, including the rights of
occupation and supreme authority with respect to Germany, short of annexation. Quint,
supra note 2, at 589 et seq.
35. Judith Reicherzer, Der letzte Schnitt, DIE ZEIT, Nov. 29, 1991, at 10.
36. Quint, supra note 2, at 630.
37. Id. at 486.
38. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 271-72.
39. Id. at 272.
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man borders brought the unification issue to the forefront of each West
German citizen's mind. 40 Accordingly, unification was a much more desir-
able goal politically than any interim solution for the rapidly disintegrat-
ing East German state.
The initial euphoria soon cooled. The West German people grew an-
noyed with the sudden and continued congestion brought about by the
floods of Eastern visitors, and frustrated by the consumer good
shortages caused by the extraordinarily high demand from the East."'
Westerners became more realistic about the consequences of reunifica-
tion. The high costs of integrating a state as backwards as the G.D.R. and
making it productive again were now unenthusiastically anticipated by
the tax-paying citizens of West Germany. The government had to move
forward rapidly with the process of unification in order to maximize the
remaining public interest and support.
4
B. The East
After the Wall's fall, Egon Krenz believed that, as a result of legal-
ized travel, the economically devastating exodus of educated and skilled
workers would decline." When instead the outflow of workers increased
after the borders opened, the government realized that more fundamental
changes were needed. This explains the rapid changes in leadership
before unification, from Egon Krenz to Hans Modrow to Lothar De
Mazi~re. Initially, Modrow had planned to continue the G.D.R.'s exis-
tence through a series of treaties with the West, a form of economic unity
that fell short of complete merger.' Ultimately, the democratically
elected leaders Modrow and De Mazi~re recognized what had long been
believed in the West: that the East German state derived justification for
its existence solely from the Communist bloc. The fall of the Soviet Em-
pire, well under way at that time, was bound to result in the disappear-
ance of the G.D.R. as a separate state. 6 Consequently, the initial plans
for alternative forms of integration with the West were abandoned, and
the Eastern leaders entered into agreements with the West and changed
their constitution to enable the 1990 merger with the F.R.G..' 7
The majority of the East German people originally opposed unifica-
tion.'8 While taking advantage of the newly available freedom of travel,
40. NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 13, 1989, at 33-38.
41. See Coburg will City sperren, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 1.
42. Interview with Robert Jeffares, Department Supervisor for Siemens-Nixdorf AG,
in Coburg, West Germany (Dec. 1989).
43. See Jochen Thies, Digesting Unification, EuR. AFF., Oct./Nov. 1991, at 14-15.
44. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 286-287.
45. Id. at 290.
46. Id. at 255. With the rflison d'6tre of the G.D.R. so closely tied to the ideology of
the Soviet empire, no form of East Germany could have continued to exist on its own. Ac-
cordingly, the collapse of the Soviet Union necessitated German unification.
47. Id. at 290-293.
48. Id. at 284.
VOL. 20:3
GERMAN UNIFICATION
uncensored media, and plentiful consumer goods, they did not immedi-
ately embrace the idea of a political merger with the West. Forty years of
indoctrination about the virtues of the Socialist system and the evils of
the free market economy produced suspicion. Citizens develop significant
pride in their state over time, irrespective of the hardships and depriva-
tions the system has imposed on them. 9 Despite the comparative superi-
ority of the Western state, many conditions in the F.R.G. elicited criti-
cism from both Eastern and Western social justice activists, particularly
conditions such as environmental exploitation, homelessness, unemploy-
ment, and the imperfections of the West German social welfare system. °
Additionally, the resentment and arrogance exhibited by Westerners to-
wards their Eastern cousins chilled the initial euphoria."
Despite these negative factors, the East Germans ultimately came to
favor expeditious unification. The reasons for the change are manifold.
Free and easy travel to the West exposed Easterners to democracy and
the social market economy of the West.2 Taking advantage of the mate-
rial consumer bounty was easy in the beginning, as every Easterner who
arrived in the West was entitled to receive a certain amount of "Welcome
Money" (Begruessungsgeld) from the local governments of their destina-
tion. 3 Businesses offered special deals to Easterners in the wake of the
euphoria."' A freed media exposed the hypocritical and exploitative lifes-
tyle of the East German leadership to an outraged people, further under-
mining the legitimacy of the socialist regime.55 Political freedom allowed
Western political parties and their leaders to preach unification in the
East. Finally, massive economic aid from the West German government
and widespread investment by West German businesses helped sway the
Easterners to ultimately favor rapid political and economic unification.5
IV. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION
A. The Present Reality
Although the historical goal of unification has finally been achieved,
the West inherited an economic nightmare, becoming fully responsible for
the East's neglected infrastructure and a bankrupt economy. Factories,
roads, power plants, buildings, and technology were mismanaged, deterio-
49. See id. at 284.
50. Bahro will zurueck in DDR, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 3. See Immer mehr
Obdachlose, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 2; see also Notstand in den Kindergaerten,
NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 18.
51. See Doppelkassierer, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 17.
52. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 285.
53. Begruessungsgeld aufgestockt, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 16, 1989, at 1.
54. Kultur zum Sondertarif, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 15, 1989, at 1; see also Die sanfte
Invasion, NEUE PRESSE, Nov. 17, 1989, at 4.
55. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 288.
56. Id. at 293-295.
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rating, and decades behind the West. 7 Even though the labor force is
skilled and well educated, the Easterners' work ethic greatly differs from
that of the West Germans'.58 Core East German industries, historically
supported by subsidies and artificial price controls, are no longer profita-
ble nor maintainable in a market economy. For example, nearly the entire
East German textile industry must be shut down because the low product
quality and high labor costs cannot compete with imports from South
East Asia. Although wages in East Germany are far lower than wages in
the West, they are still higher than wages in the textile-exporting Asian
countries. Attempts to upgrade portions of the industry to manufacture
high-quality clothes failed because the sewing machine operators were un-
able to handle the high-quality textile materials as quickly as they han-
dled low-grade fabrics. 9
The Treuhandanstalt, a recently created government agency acting
as a public trustee, is attempting to sell East German production facilities
to Western owners. However, Easterners regard the agency with increas-
ing suspicion. The East-CDU favors a policy of preserving independent,
locally-owned businesses rather than the Treuhandanstalt's policy of
auctioning off Eastern industries to outsiders.60 The East German work-
ers feel that the Treuhandanstalt - created in Bonn by Western politi-
cians - is more interested in high sales than in preserving work places. 1
The East still struggles under widespread unemployment, which
places a tremendous burden on public finances. Many Easterners actually
experienced a decline in their standard of living due to increasing prices
and decreasing income.2
The West struggles also. Revitalization of the East will cost more
than originally anticipated. Taxes have already increased and may rise
even more. Many hard-working and tax-paying Westerners feel resent-
ment towards the perceived lack of work ethic on the part of the Eas-
terners." Economic indicators forecast a possible recession. 4 At the same
57. See generally Thies, supra note 43, at 14-15 (explaining the overall economic con-
ditions existing in East Germany).
58. Interview with Ingo Bechmann, college student and part-time construction worker,
in Coburg, West Germany (December 1989). The then twenty-year-old West German Mr.
Bechmann told of an incident where a crew of newly hired construction workers from the
East quit working at approximately eleven o'clock in the morning. When questioned by
their superior, they answered that the expected delivery of supplies had not yet arrived;
from that they concluded that it would not arrive that same or even the next day. When
asked why they didn't complete other tasks until the delivery arrived, they answered that
nobody had told them to do so. This attitude reflects the workers' adaptation to working
conditions where needed supplies could not be relied on, and individual efforts were not
rewarded.
59. Reicherzer, supra note 35.
60. Peter Christ, Bonn greift ein, DIE ZEIT, Dec. 27, 1991, at 10.
61. Marlies Menge, Gute Lage als Verhaengnis, DIE ZEIT, Dec. 27, 1991, at 22.
62. Peter Christ, Immer Aerger mit den Preisen, DIE ZEIT, Nov. 8, 1991, at 10.
63. See generally Thies, supra note 43, at 14-15 (explaining the sentiments felt by
many East and West Germans since unification).
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time, politicians sympathize with the economic plight of the Easterners:
"They didn't go into the streets in the fall of 1989 only to be thrown out
into the streets in the fall of 1991!" ' 5
Unification produced another problem: an increase of right-wing ex-
tremism in both states, but particularly in the East. The rise of Skinhead
and Neo-Nazi groups in the East may be a temporary reaction to the
disappearance of political uniformity and censorship. Other probable rea-
sons include the psychological effects of fundamental political change and
economic depression. The self-perceived underdogs vent their frustrations
and fear of future uncertainties by directing violence against those who
are even worse off: political refugees with dark skin color, foreign accents,
and no place of their own. Ordinary Easterners, observing this drift of
ideological violence to the other extreme, feel that law enforcement au-
thorities are appallingly passive in their task of controlling such
excesses.
66
One Wall has been torn down, but because of the economic and psy-
chological differences between the East and the West, a second wall re-
mains. It is a psychological wall, built not by bricks and mortar, but by
forty-five years of separate economies, ideologies, and public goals, and
vast differences in the means available for private individuals to achieve
their personal goals.6 1
B. Unrealized Alternatives
Analyzing the current changes in Germany, one questions whether a
different approach to unification would have been more sensible. The
benefits of a fast unification are identifiable. Reuniting quickly creates
certainty; both domestically and internationally. Any delay in the process
would have continued the drain of the work force from the East into the
better-paying West. The political procedure of unification was a condition
precedent to the substantive task of economical and cultural re-approach-
ment and accommodation. Additionally, the German merger provides a
framework for other European states to.follow.
However, one should consider the advantages of a slower speed to-
ward unification. If the F.R.G. would have evaluated and planned the
task of economic upgrading, the people subject to the changes would have
had the opportunity to readjust their skills and their economic, political,
and social outlook. The labor drain would have continued without unifi-
cation; however, the drain goes on even after unification due to the higher
wages prevailing in the West. 8 A slower pace would have soothed some of
64. Die Zeichen stehen auf Sturm, DIE ZEIT, Jan. 10, 1992, at 9.
65. Zitat des Jahres: Brandenburg Ministerpraesident Manfred Stolpe, DIE ZEIT,
Jan. 3, 1992, at 2.
66. Christ, supra note' 62.
67. Thies, supra note 43, at 15.
68. Reicherzer, supra note 35.
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the present difficulties.8 9
One should also consider the unrealized advantages of an alternative
to the process as a whole. Rudolf Bahro proposed the co-existence of the
two German states in close cooperation." The G.D.R. Roundtable seri-
ously considered this option and developed a supporting document."
The Roundtable envisioned the constitution for the new G.D.R. to
contain provisions securing a full range of liberal defensive rights and af-
firmative social welfare rights, including rights to shelter, medical care,
and employment; a new system of property rights incorporating both pri-
vate and publicly owned property; an independent judiciary; a federation
consisting of the re-created Laender and a central parliamentary govern-
ment; and a mechanism allowing for popular votes in the parliament. 2
These intellectuals viewed the decline of the G.D.R. as an opportunity for
more than a mere merger into an already existing system. They believed a
chance existed for extracting the positive aspects of the G.D.R. - albeit
existing largely in theory - and those of the F.R.G., and incorporating
them into a new state, one with a system of democracy, affirmative enti-
tlements and political rights.
The co-existing states may have provided an alternative to the tradi-
tional East-West dichotomy. Unfortunately, a complete renewal from an
environmentally, politically and socially mismanaged state into the ideal
opposite was too unrealistic to implement. The ingrained traditions pro-
duced by the G.D.R.'s communist regime fatally handicapped the possi-
bility of such a metamorphosis. The lack of leadership and hard cash
made certain this proposal's impossibility.7 3
V. THE NEXT FORTY-FIVE YEARS AND BEYOND
A swift political unification process cannot substitute for the labors
and pains necessary to economically and psychologically integrate two so-
cieties. Economically, the work has just begun. The Treuhandanstalt's
mission of reorganizing production facilities into profitable businesses and
soliciting national and international investment is far from complete. So-
lutions for the persisting high unemployment rates must be developed
and implemented. The gap in living standards needs to be, equalized to
avoid a permanent division of the nation into Haves and Have-Nots. This
latter issue demands particular attention because of the Basic Law's man-
date for a social market economy. Finally, environmental clean-up must
become and remain a priority.
69. See generally Thies, supra note 43, at 15 (describing the conflicting sentiments
about unification held by East and West Germans).
70. Bahro will zurueck in DDR, supra note 50. (Rudolf Bahro was a prominent East-
German politician who had been expelled from the G.D.R.).
71. See discussion supra part IIB.
72. Quint, supra note 2, at 494.
73. McCurdy, supra note 1, at 2 2.
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These economic tasks seem most urgent and overwhelming in light of
the tremendous volume of human resources lost to unemployment. Tak-
ing into account the involuntary part-timers, early retired, and those par-
ticipating in retraining programs, the true unemployment rate in the East
approaches thirty-eight percent.7" The overall unemployment numbers
are predicted to remain high, which is the natural consequence of the
fast-paced reunification: "It is impossible to radically restructure an econ-
omy and increase the value of a currency by 300% overnight, without
experiencing a collapse of the labor market. The decision for a fast
change was also the decision for a massive loss of jobs."7
As the process of unification continues, some regions in the East are
experiencing significant economic recovery with prospects for labor
shortages in the near future.7 6 An economic turn-around for the East is
generally expected to occur perhaps as soon as this year." The economic
challenges are being met and are likely to resolve themselves in the near
future.
In the long run, however, further-reaching problems are likely to
challenge the German people. The enormous legal, ethical, and psycholog-
ical dilemmas created by the East's dictatorial past must be confronted
and resolved. These dilemmas include: claims of property owners who
were expropriated by the G.D.R. and who now have to compete with sub-
sequently created interests of G.D.R. citizens; other problems arising
from the question of the legitimacy of judicial decisions that sent political
dissidents to prison; and the accountability of those who planted land
mines and ordered torture and executions. The German term for the pro-
cess is Vergangenheitsbewaeltigung: facing and mastering one's past. The
expression describes Germany's manner of confronting its Nazi past; now
it also characterizes their involvement with the Communist past. Unlike
the Nazi memory, a national guilt shared by the entire German people,
this new awareness of political wrongdoing, decades of human rights vio-
lations, and prostitution by the judicial and administrative systems splits
the German people in half. The Westerners accuse the Easterners of mur-
dering, imprisoning, and informing on innocent citizens. The opening of
Stasi documents reveals much wrongdoing that has occurred over the
G.D.R.'s existence: children spying on parents, neighbors turning in
neighbors, Stasi officials hunting down their own rank and file.78 Former
low-ranking, order-taking border patrols are now standing trial and facing
punishment for homicide and human rights violations to the same extent
74. Birgit Breuel, A Social Market Economy Cannot Be Introduced Overnight, EUR.
AFF., Dec. 1991, at 28.
75. Dirk Kurbjuweit, Jeder Dritte Ohne Arbeit, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 14, 1992, at 10.
76. Peter Christ, Der Osten Schreibt Rot, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 6, 1992, at 7.
77. Id.
78. See Christian Wernicke, Vorgang Auf!, DIE ZEIT, Mar. 13, 1992, at 11; Joachim
Nawrocki, Vor einem Berg des Unrechtes, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 28, 1992, at 5.
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as high-ranking officials who issued the deadly orders. 9 They, having ac-
ted under color of East German law, have to answer for their past under
West German law before West German courts.
Judicial determination of guilt poses moral and ethical dilemmas.
The G.D.R. constitution guaranteed freedom of speech and association,
and G.D.R. criminal law prohibited murder, manslaughter, torture, extor-
tion, battery and kidnapping, just like the F.R.G.'s constitution and stat-
utes. 0 However, the G.D.R. was governed not by the rule of law but by
dictatorship. Once again Germany faces the ethical question of prosecut-
ing not only those who created an unjust system but also those who lived
by the system's rule:
Only if the investigation proceeds systematically ... will we be able to
penetrate through individual cases to the structure of responsibility.
Then we will reach the tip of the hierarchy. Whoever planted the bug
into the private apartment is really irrelevant. Responsible are those
who created the system.8'
Realistically, many West Germans will have difficulty differentiating
between those who ordered the murders and those who carried them out.
The Westerners' self-righteous engagement in witch hunts results, for
many Easterners, in ruinous publicity or prohibitions on professional en-
gagement.8 " This antagonism may be a result of the Westerners exper-
iencing unification as initiated by and imposed from the government
above,8 3 while having to bear the financial burdens, especially following
the levy of the new "Solidarity Assessment" tax.8 4
How Easterners and Westerners deal with the dynamics of public
sentiment will be crucially important to the success or failure of the new
nation. Gaps of such a nature take longer to bridge than solving economic
problems or cleaning up severe environmental damage. The "Wall in the
Head" may stand strong for a long time to come.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the West, the primary driving forces leading to swift unification
were historical and cultural commitment, while economic emergency and
political disintegration. served as primary motivating factors for the East.
The German people are now experiencing the consequences of their
rapid reunification: the West shoulders a tremendous financial burden
and restructuring responsibility, while the East suffers sudden and previ-
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ously unknown unemployment and economic depression. Both face a
stressful and uncertain future. A slower and more deliberate strategy
would have allowed for a greater opportunity to prepare and adjust. Ad-
ditionally, a more planned approach possibly could have offered opportu-
nities for creative development not only of the Eastern, but also of the
Western political and economic structure.
Looking forward, the new states of the East are likely to adjust, and
an overall economic recovery is likely to occur in the East in the near
future. However, the psychological and cultural re-approachment and the
confrontation with the East's dictatorial history presents a problem that
will take much longer to settle among the newly unified German people.
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